Marquette Law Review
Volume 13
Issue 4 June 1929

Article 13

Pleading: Demurrer for Non-Joinable Causes of
Action Intermingled in One Count
Gerald F. Hardy

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Gerald F. Hardy, Pleading: Demurrer for Non-Joinable Causes of Action Intermingled in One Count, 13 Marq. L. Rev. 253 (1929).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol13/iss4/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

NOTES AND COMMENT

from the legislature. This leads one to speculate on the possibilities
of there being a change in the law of lateral support through legislation. 'In the Wellauer case, the plaintiff based the defendant's liability on a city ordinance which provided: "Any person, firm, or
corporation making excavations or causing the same to be made, shall
properly guard them and shall protect them that the adjoining soil shall
not cave in, and no one shall excavate so as to injure any adjoining
ground or building.'3 The court held that this ordinance could not be
interpreted as placing the duty of supporting the building on the party
doing the work. On page 24 Eschweiler, J. points out that "such well
established property rights as are here involved cannot be taken away
or substantially changed except by express declaration of the legislature, either by statute or by expressly delegating such power to the
common council. Neither of such is found in this case." The ordinance has apparently never been changed. Since this decision was
handed down the Home Rule Amendment was added to our constitution. We wonder what would be the effect of a charter ordinance
similar to the ordinance quoted above, bearing in mind the fact that
the law on lateral support as it exists in Wisconsin today is entirely
bench made law.
JoHN

J. McRAE

Pleading; Demurrer for Nonjoinable Causes of Action Intermingled in One Count
Ernst vs. Schmidt 223 N.W. 559 (Wis.)
Plaintiff loaned money to the Elmwood Co., a corporation engaged
in the development of Texas oil lands. The defendants, stockholders
in said corporation, agreed in writing that in the event that the plaintiff was compelled to foreclose on the corporate property to secure
the loan, they would pay their pro rata share of the loan and take their
pro rata share of the fee. The debt was not paid, plaintiff foreclosed
on said property, and now sues the stockholders to obtain the amount
of the loan according to the agreement.
The plaintiff joined the defendants in one action, failing to separately
state and number the separate causes of action. The defendants demurred separately on the ground that several causes of action had been
improperly united. The lower court overruled this demurrer. On
appeal it was held that such demurrer should have been sustained. The
court said -that where the causes of action are joined in one complaint,
and instead of being individually stated in separate counts they are
joined in one count, the defective pleading is properly reached under
'Milwaukee

Code of

1914, IV, 43.
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the statute by a motion to make more definite and certain. This goes
upon the theory that causes of action are joinable, and can b e properly pleaded in one complaint. On the other hand, where they are
nonjoinable, they have no proper place in the complaint at all, and
cannot be united, either in separate counts or in a jumble in one count.
It is therefore considered that -the statute requiring a motion to make
more definite and certain was intended for an intermingling of nonjoinable causes of action in one count, leaving an intermingling of nonjoinable causes of action in one count subject to the statutory provision which authorizes a demurrer where two or more causes of action
are improperly united. This distinction is manifested to a degree in
the decisions of this court, and seems to be the uniform rule in other
jurisdictions.
A defect in joining causes of action in one count may be reached by
a motion to make more certain by separately stating and numbering
where causes are joinable, but where there are nonjoinable causes of
action which cannot be united in the complaint, either in separate or
in single counts; such a complaint is demurrable and it is not necessary
to make a motion to separately state and number before demurring.
The court follows the case of Fischer vs. Hintz, 145 Minn. 161, 176
N. W. 177, which holds that defendants may demur for misjoinder,
though the pleading in form sets forth but one cause of action, if in
reality it embraces two or more that cannot be joined in any form.1
An examination of the authorities upon -the subject in this state discloses that in Buerger vs. Buerger, 178 Wis. 352, i9o N. W. 126, and
July vs. Adams, 178 Wis. 375, i9 o N. W. 89, and McIntyre vs. Carroll,
193 Wis. 382, 214 N. W. 366, language is used based, however, upon
the respective issues in these cases, which does not distinguish between
joinable and nonjoinable causes of action.
After due and careful consideration, the court is of the opinion that
a distinction between joinable and nonjoinable causes of action should
be definitely recognized. By so doing the court will be in harmony
with the overwhelming weight of authority in other jurisdictions.
GERALD

F.

HARDY

Statute of Frauds; Extrinsic Evidence in Relation to Description
In Pierson vs. Dorff,-Wis.-, 223 N. W. 579, the validity of an
agreement for the sale of real estate was questioned on the ground that
the description of the property did not comply with the Statute of
1

Poneroy's Code Remedies, sec. 344; Bass v. Upton, I Minn. 408 (Gil. 292) ;

Anderson v. Scandia Bank, 53 Minn. 191, 54 N.W. lO62; Goldberg v. Utley, 6o

N.Y. 427; Leidersdorf v. Second Ward Bank, 50 Wis. 406, 7 N.W. 3o6; Mulholland v. Rapp, 5o Mo. 42.

